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ABSTRACT
The quest for multilayered governance faces the problem of endemic tensions and
disagreements in international relations and doubts as to whether nations truly share
common values upon which an international society can be solidly built. Values, how-
ever, are equally controversial within the nation-state. We find similar tensions within
domestic and regional layers of governance. In any system of governance, diverging and
competing values are inevitable. There are differences in degree, but not in principle,
when comparing traits of domestic and international governance. Legal experience in
the fields of human rights and international trade regulation indicates that under such
conditions, procedures are of prime importance. On all levels alike, procedural instru-
ments and guarantees play a key role in arbitrating between competing values, interests,
and rights. These guarantees today are unevenly developed, not only in comparing differ-
ent layers ofgovernment, but also foremost in comparing different countries forming part
of the international system. They are far from perfect, but offer the way forwardfor fur-
ther work toward a coherent legal theory of multilayered governance.
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INTRODUCTION
Regulatory matters are increasingly and simultaneously dealt with in both
domestic and international law. They involve shared responsibilities of local and
central government. In addition, they may be informed and addressed by norms
of international law. This constellation of multiple responsibilities in regulatory
matters is perhaps most advanced in Europe with the European Union and its
solid layer of regional law of integration, but it is a trait shared world-wide with
cooperation increasing in almost all fields of law. The principles and rules of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and other instruments of trade regulation
form part of an emerging system of multilayered governance whose different reg-
ulatory levels interact in a mutually supportive, or sometimes conflicting, manner.
Contemporary challenges in the process of globalization, in particular climate
change mitigation and the financial breakdown of 2008, will further enhance the
need for shared regulations, cooperation, and interaction of domestic and interna-
tional law. These challenges are difficult to meet by taking recourse to the tradi-
tional divide of domestic and international law.
The framework has reached its limitations. Many states continue to operate
under dualist traditions, which treat international law and domestic law as two
distinct and separate realms. Subjects of law, and standing before institutions, are
defined differently in these states. Even in monist traditions, the direct effect of
international law in domestic law is often denied, and the two spheres end up
being artificially separated.' While international law affects people, the people
often cannot invoke it or rely upon it. Contemporary and future challenges of
globalization therefore call for an intellectual framework that allows the classical
division to be overcome and brings about a more coherent and rational interaction
of different regulatory layers, including international law and global relations.
This is essentially what the doctrines of multilayered governance and constitu-
tionalization of international law seek to bring about.
Legal scholars working on constitutional approaches to international law and
the doctrine of multilayered governance encompassing local, subnational, regional,
and global levels of governance face severe theoretical and practical objections. It is
argued that underlying values and morality strongly differ among nations and soci-
eties and therefore do not offer a solid foundation for common, international legal
1. Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The Relationship Between World Trade
Organization Law, National and Regional Law, IJ. INT'L EcoN. L. 83, 120 (1998).
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structures.' It is further argued that pluralism and cultural diversity around the
globe imply that a particular moral consensus exists within a given state, nation,
people, or civilization. However, it cannot extend to an international society at large.'
These values are best protected within the state.4 Once we move beyond borders, we
enter moral conflict as different societies pursue different purposes. The morality of
international law is profoundly distinct from domestic systems with their own prin-
ciples of international conduct.' Moral and legal obligations relating to fairness and
justice incurred behind the veil of ignorance within a society cannot be extended to
other countries and the globe for similar reasons.' The lack of common values ren-
ders futile all efforts at comprehensive regulation and at defining hierarchies in
what remains a highly fragmented world of legal relations.7 The early school of real-
ists denied the existence and impact of morality in international relations and con-
sidered recourse to it as a matter of exercising power.8 This tradition, shaped by the
experiences of World War II and the Cold War, is still reflected in contemporary
writing.9 Attempts to build global structures are, therefore, deemed to be flawed,
vain exercises in idealism and legalism. For such reasons, it is argued and held that
international law remains clearly distinct from the body of national law.' Unlike
domestic law, it is said to lack any police power." It is effective, the argument goes,
2. For a very careful analysis and discussion, see ANDREW HURRELL, ON GLOBAL ORDER: POWER,
VALUES, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 10 (2004).
3. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER
54-55 (1997).
4. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 240-
41(1977).
5. TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 241 (1983).
6. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES REVISITED WITH "THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASONS REVIS-
ITED" 171 (1999).
7. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Diversity or Cacophony?: New Sources of
Norms in International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1059, 1068 (2004); see also GUNTHER TEUBNER,
RECHT ALS AUTOPOIETISCHES SYSTEM 25-28 (1989).
8. See E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, i919-I939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS 146 (1939); HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 246-47 (6th ed. 1985) (discussing that they were actu-
ally hoping that moral values play a more important role in addressing various security dilemmas;
however, their assessment of the times in 1948 explains their stance on values and how these were
abused by state leaders); KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 38
(1959).
9. E.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 3, at 308-11.
10. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005).
11. Mireille Hildebrandt, Governance, Governmentality, Police, and Justice: A New Science of Po-
lice?, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 557, 578 (2008) (book review).
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only to the extent that it operates on the basis of convergence of interests, coordina-
tion of interests, and coercion.12 The two cannot merge. Even scholars who have
dedicated their lives to the building of international and supranational structures
have strong doubts. Eric Stein concludes his analysis of international organizations
and democratic legitimacy on the level of international law on a skeptical note, de-
spite a disposition toward further democratization and integration: "[h]owever, in
view of the ... persistent, deep-rooted differences in the peoples-cultural-ethnic,
economic, and political-there is little evidence that the democracy-legitimacy gap
can be filled by 'Great and Desperate Cures' at the global level at any rate."13 On the
other hand, he notes that there is ample evidence that "creative, idiosyncratic ar-
rangements commensurate with the respective level of integration are called for in
both the national and the international institutions."14 At any rate, it seems the idea
of constitutionalization of international law is fundamentally flawed and should not
be pursued. 5 Any work on constitutionalization of international law and multilay-
ered governance must come to grips with such fundamental objections. They must
be assessed and examined before any steps in institution-building can be taken.
In Part I, this article argues that this divergence of values is not unique to in-
ternational relations; it is equally present in a domestic context. Differences are a
matter of degree, and not of principle. Hence, institutional structures need not
fundamentally differ, and the search for common ground is appropriate in the
quest for shared values upon which common structures and procedures can be
solidly built. In Part II, this article addresses the foundations of multilayered gov-
ernance, discussing the implications of human rights and international economic
law and identifying a common and shared core. But rather than seeking founda-
tions based upon harmony and shared values alone, Parts III and IV submit that
we need to focus legal attention on developing appropriate procedures of decision-
making and dispute settlement within a future framework of multilayered gover-
nance. It is in this respect that agreement and consent remain of prime importance
in a pluralist world.
12. GOLDSMITH & PosNER, supra note 10, at 12.
13. Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Loveat First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
489, 534 (2001).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO's "Constitution" and the Disci-
pline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647, 661 (2005) (discussing those ideas in the context
of the WTO).
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I. PLURALISM AND TENSIONS
A. Differences and Challenges
The reality of international relations lends support to the view that interna-
tional relations operate on fundamentally different premises and planes than the
domestic political process: all politics are based upon nationality and the frame-
work of national constitutions. Many argue that the public sphere, essential for
democracy, is limited to the domestic realm. They look at global affairs mainly
from the point of view of nationally-defined interests. 6 From this perspective, the
law is essentially framed on the basis of national constitutions, while international
relations are merely subject to weak structures of international law that are devoid
of effective mechanisms of implementation and highly dependent upon voluntary
compliance. Power, much more than values and morality, plays a significant role
and is exercised on the basis of national interests. Governments are accountable to
national voters, not the international society at large. Legitimacy is based upon
popular sovereignty, while limited to consent in international relations. Conse-
quently, responsibility to protect remains minimal in international law, even in
the core field of protecting human lives. Just observe how human rights are con-
stantly violated around the world and how such violations remain without effec-
tive responses. They are best protected to the extent that the international
standards are absorbed into domestic law. International solidarity is mainly rhe-
torical and not a reality. The same is true for the global commons. Exploitation of
natural resources shows a complete lack of global governance and responsibility.
Efforts at combating climate change have remained largely dysfunctional and are
driven by national interests to secure access to energy and resources in support of
growth and economic welfare. Vested interests loom large and accountability to
people is the exception rather than the rule. There are still a large number of au-
thoritarian states not inclined to lend support to democratic values, which are at
the heart of good governance. Even in Western nations, existing structures of
multilayered governance-in particular those of the European Union, the most
advanced project of this kind-are still met with skepticism and barred from
adopting the symbols of constitutionalism, which public opinion in most coun-
16. See Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic: A Skeptic's View, in DE-
MOCRACY'S EDGES 19,26 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cord6n eds., 1999).
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tries prefers to limit to the traditional nation-state.17 The world is in constant
moral, political, and economic conflict. Common values, if they exist at all, are
hard to identify.
These arguments supporting relativism may lead to resignation. But they also
reinforce the need to seek new and better structures of governance for coming
generations and to refine a relationship between global, regional, and domestic
law. They are powerful drivers, not in the sense of desperate cures, but as an im-
pulse for processes to move in the right direction. We need a better and univer-
sally valid intellectual compass to find appropriate directions for future structures
of governance and law.
We should not forget that the state of nature did not prevent Thomas Hobbes
from turning to shared and contractual arrangements in order to keep the peace,
albeit at a cost to society and individuals. It did not prevent John Locke, Jeremy Ben-
tham, and Baron de la Bride et de Montesquieu from developing constitutional
structures when in law they did not exist at the time. It did not prevent Adam Smith
from challenging the deeply entrenched mercantilism in his time. It did not prevent
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay from developing principles of
federalism when colonialism was dominant. It did not prevent philosophers like
Francisco Suarez and Emerich Vattel from developing the foundations of interna-
tional law. It did not prevent Immanuel Kant from exploring the potential of an
international society when reality was far from reaching these ideals. In the twenti-
eth century, it did not prevent world leaders from conceiving the United Nations
and the process of European integration, despite a past pointing to the contrary.8
The quest for peace has been a strong antidote to realist resignation in the
building of nation-states and international law. It is the same quest which today
drives the effort toward multilayered governance in a globalized world character-
ized by instant communication. Realists contribute to stabilizing existing power
structures and relations. They are important in terms of reality checks and debate.
They sharpen the arguments for, and the foundations of, multilayered governance,
the life of international law, and the long-term realization of values shared by all
mankind. They ensure that we do not build on shifting sand. But they offer little in
terms of improving governance and conditions for the majority of people around
17. Cf Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and For-
eign Policy: A New Constitutional Paradigm?, in EUROPA UND SEINE VERFASSUNG 176, 182-86 (Char-
lotte Gaitanides et al. eds., 2005).
18. PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 25,26 (2006).
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the world or of addressing common concerns in the process of globalization. The
effort is one addressing, and coping with, the huge deficiencies of the Westphalian
system of nation-states in the post-colonial and partly post-national era.
B. Shared Problems
The starting point is a rather trivial observation: tension and conflict are not
limited to international relations. They exist on all layers of governance alike: do-
mestic, regional, and international. Theories of international relations, rather
than ignoring the fact that disagreement is not unique to international relations
and law, should look at the full picture. They should no longer look at the nation-
state as a unitary subject and actor. Theories of justice often assume basic coher-
ence in a given society as a basis of democracy, distributive justice, and fairness. 9
They presuppose a community of shared values, which offers the basis of mutual
trust for democracy, delegation of powers, and majority rule." True, domestic
societies, organized on the basis of shared language, education, and culture, offer
a wider range of common perceptions, attitudes, and traditions. Yet, values are
equally controversial within the nation-state.
We find similar tensions within domestic and regional layers of governance.
19. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1971).
20. Anne Peters concisely recalls the argument
that a democracy must be "homogeneous" to be stable, because only then all (or
at any rate the vast majority) of the people share a commitment to the state and
its democratic regime form, they are tied to their fellow citizens through an un-
derstanding of the commonality of their fate and the recognition of equal liber-
ties, and they rank these commitments and loyalties higher than the various
cleavages that divide national society. A more psychological explanation why
democratic procedures are premised on the faith and trust deriving from fellow-
ship in a core community is that the unpredictability of results, the disappoint-
ment of compromise, and the confusion of choices is generally not borne by
groups in which the sentiments of commonality and belonging are absent. The
ideas of uniformity, fellowship, and collective identity overlap with the quest for
a societal "basic consensus." The basic consensus is-so to speak-the unifor-
mity of opinions on the foundational principles of society. It is considered as the
pre-requisite of majority decisions, because the basic consensus guarantees the
stability of institutions, serves as a guideline for deciding controversial issues,
discharges politics on those issues where no vote is needed, and generally triggers
the diffuse support of the system by its citizens.
Letter from Anne Peters, Professor of Law, Universitat Basel, to author (Dec. 5,
2008) (on file with author).
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Pluralist societies are not rooted in uniform moral perceptions. In any system of
governance, diverging and competing values are inevitable. They may be sup-
pressed, but they exist and should be recognized in pluralist societies. The nature
of all political debate is disagreement, the pursuit of interests, and the search for
common ground. A wide variety of values informs the debate and discourse. All
relations, whether domestic or international, are inherently human; differences
are differences in degree, rather than principle, and are clearly demarcated.
It is one-sided to conceive of nations and domestic society as harmonious and
coherent, while also emphasizing tensions and conflict in international relations.
Peace is as much at risk at home as it is abroad. Of the nearly one hundred armed
conflicts in the world since 1989, all but five were, or are, internal conflicts, albeit
mainly due to the end of the bipolar world that froze ethnic conflict.21 These figures
suggest that building societies and states on all layers has been, and remains, a long-
term process. Cultural homogeneity and political consensus on basic values as an
alleged prerequisite for democracy in mature societies is the result of a long-term
historical process and experience. Constitutions acquire authority only over time as
they produce public goods and welfare. They were generally weak, opposed and
even imposed, at the outset when the experiment of new democracy was taken up
without a well-established society in place. From a historical perspective, governance
has not been static but rather subject to evolution and constant change.
The same applies to international governance. Generally weak at this time, in
a world of economic interdependence, it may change and evolve in response to
global challenges such as climate change. New communities of shared interest
may emerge, forming the foundations for new forms of political culture and de-
mocracy on matters vitally relevant to the entire globe. Any start will be difficult,
controversial, and contested. This is the nature of political debate. Again, there is
no fundamental difference in principle between different layers of governance.
A more detailed examination offers a mixed bag. The achievements of civiliza-
tion are juxtaposed anarchy, conflict, and even war in all forms of human society.
We find a mixture of peace and conflict at local, regional, national, continental, and
world-wide levels and relations. This mixture, rather than a clinical separation be-
tween the domestic and international realms, offers a realistic starting point from
which to assess the issue of shared values and the potential for multilayered gover-
nance based upon the rule of law. We cannot draw a fundamental line between the
domestic and international realms. Sovereignty cannot separate domestic and inter-
21. KENNEDY,SUpra note 18, at 105.
MULTILAYERED GOVERNANCE
national life completely.22 Domestic and international tensions need to be considered
in tandem. Modern and liberal theories of international relations increasingly con-
firm this proposition. States are not unitary actors. Foreign relations are influenced
and shaped by competing values and interests at home. While realism was strongly
concerned with national security, the emphasis on international cooperation within
international organizations has gradually shifted the focus toward greater account-
ability in international politics and thus toward constitutional issues, bridging the
divide between the domestic and international realms.
2 3
II. MULTILAYERED GOVERNANCE AND COSMOPOLITAN VALUES
A. Emerging Constitutionalism
1. The Legal Effort
Confronted with the challenges of the WTO and of human rights protection,
international lawyers set out to assess underlying problems in terms of constitutional
theory. 24 The effort is part of a broader movement to overcome the classical and
conceptual division between international and domestic law of the Westphalian sys-
tem of nation-states and the reconfiguration of states in the process of globaliza-
tion. 25 The process essentially comprises the fields of human rights and international
economic law. In both areas, a controversial debate on the constitutionalization of
22. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20 (1999) (studying the
various interactions of international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sover-
eignty, and interdependence sovereignty).
23. See ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 253 (1999); Judith Gold-
stein & Robert 0. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN
POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE 3,25 (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane
eds., 1993); Helen V. Milner, Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American,
and Comparative Politics, 52 INT'L ORG. 759, 759 (1998); Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seri-
ously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 520 (1997); Robert D. Putnam,
Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 455 (1988).
24. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION
(Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991);
Thomas Cottier & Maya Hertig, The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism, 7 MAX PLANCK
Y.B.U.N.L. 261 (2004); Jurgen Habermas, The Constitutionalization of International Law and the
Legitimation Problem of a Constitution for World Society, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 444 (2008); Anne
Peters, The Globalization of State Constitutions, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (Janne Nijman & Andr6 Nollkaemper eds., 2007).
25. See TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE STATE? 6 (Stephan Leibfried & Michael Zurn eds., 2005).
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international law is taking place. While many competing concepts of constitutional-
ism are employed 26 and some authors suggest abandoning the term,27 the effort
shares the common concern of looking at international law and domestic law in a
more coherent manner.28 Influenced by the traditions of federalism, lawyers and
political scientists focus on the interaction and the allocation of powers among dif-
ferent layers of governance.2 It is essentially a matter of finding appropriate criteria
for the allocation of regulatory powers to, and the balance within, different layers of
governance-global, regional, domestic, and local-and defining the proper inter-
action of these layers within a modern concept of nation-state sovereignty."
These various models of constitutionalization offer an appropriate frame-
work for analysis, without prejudging how powers should ultimately be allocated.
The crucial point is to conceive international, regional, and domestic levels as a
single and ideally coherent regulatory architecture of multilayered governance.
Multilayered governance proposes a process and direction. It does not stand for
the idea of world government or a comprehensive world legislature, but it builds
upon the interaction and interdependence of the domestic and international
spheres, and seeks what Eric Stein called "creative, idiosyncratic arrangements
commensurate with the respective level of integration. ... "31 Multilayered gover-
nance thus requires common foundations applicable to all these layers while at the
26. Efforts comprise three schools of thought. The first school of thought emphasizes mainly in-
formal horizontal and vertical networks ofgovernment. For an example of this first school of thought,
see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEw WORLD ORDER 135-51 (2004). The second school of thought
discusses global administrative law. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 27-31 (2005). For a critical appraisal of this sec-
ond school of thought, see Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and
Values, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 187, 207-11 (2006). The third school of thought involves institutional or
public law. For an example, see Armin von Bogdandy et al., Developing the Publicness of Public Inter-
national Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1375,
1380-81 (2008).
27. DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2005);
Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy Through "Higher Law"? Why Constitutionalizing
the WTO Is a Step Too Far, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 307,
308 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2006).
28. Cottier & Hertig, supra note 24, at 263; Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis, Concluding Re-
marks, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 27, at 349,353.
29. For a seminal work in political science, see Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the
Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governance, 97 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 233, 234 (2003).
30. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (2006); John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (2003) [hereinafter Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern].
31. Stein, supra note 13, at 534.
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same time respecting diversity and pluralism. The framework builds upon obser-
vations of legal phenomena-which we perceive in reality-in particular, the in-
creased outsourcing of regulatory and constitutional functions to international
law in the process of cooperation and integration. It further develops normative
projections as to how relations between different layers of governance should be
framed in a coherent and less fragmented manner. It is both analytical and pro-
spective. It increasingly informs the debate on the future of international economic
law,32 and it offers the potential to render the legal theory truly global and inter-
national, leaving behind strong focus on national traditions.33
Multilayered governance builds upon the achievements of the Western consti-
tutionalism and federalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It essen-
tially draws on the experience gained within the realm of domestic affairs: the
protection of human rights and property rights, fairness, equal opportunities, dis-
tributive justice, democracy and accountable government, the rule of law, and
checks and balances, both horizontal and vertical. Within the wide range of dif-
ferent proposals submitted by scholars, these elements all play a key role in shap-
ing the future of international law and organizations.34 Multilayered governance
thus relies upon a common and shared body of underlying constitutional values
and legal principles, which penetrate all layers of governance alike. Today, these
foundations exist in positive international law and are formally shared by the con-
stitutions of a large number of states.
Since World War II, the developments of international law have increasingly
absorbed Western traditions of liberalism in advancing the ideals of human rights
and of equal conditions of competition in international economic law.35 There is
no shortage of instruments to which a large majority of states have consented and
which they formally share under the auspices of the United Nations and other
international organizations. They share common concerns with normative prin-
ciples and rules in regional and domestic law. Human rights are an ideal common
to all layers of governance, and principles of non-discrimination in economic rela-
32. See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (John H. Jackson & William J.
Davey eds., 2008).
33. See generally Anne Peters, Die Zukunft der Volkerrechtswissenschaft: Wider den epistemischen
Nationalismus, 67 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 721
(2007) (ascribing to international law the potential to lead the globalization of legal theory).
34. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the World Trade Organization: Building a Founda-
tion of Administrative Law, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAwsupra note 32, at 71.
35. John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism
in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379,382 (1982).
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tions can equally be found at different layers of government, complementing each
other. Domestic constitutions and legal orders have been increasingly influenced
and shaped by international law. 6
Human rights overall have the potential to play an important structural role
in multilayered governance. This is particularly true for core rights limiting the
powers of governments. International law limits such powers in the same way
that constitutional rights limit the powers of sub-federal entities. They exert verti-
cal checks and balances and thus form an important ingredient of multilayered
governance. Human rights on a global and a regional level offer checks on domes-
tic law, much as constitutional rights monitor legislation of federal and sub-federal
entities. The emphasis on past and contemporary protection is clear within consti-
tutional and domestic law. Conceptually, it does not exclude reinforcing protec-
tion on the international and regional layers of governance.
In economic law, non-discrimination and equal conditions of competition are
basic foundations that express shared values. They stand for the principle of treating
foreigners and foreign products no less favorably than domestic subjects and prod-
ucts. They have the potential to become cornerstones of multilayered governance.
Historically, both in federal and integrated systems, they were present at the outset
of a long-term process, which eventually expanded to include additional policy areas
beyond trade regulation. They qualify the principle of sovereign equality of states,
and introduce key elements of multilayered governance, as these principles intro-
duce vertical checks and balances against protectionist policies that disregard the
interests of those not represented in domestic legislative processes.37
Structurally, the principles operate in the same manner as constitutional rights
relating to commerce (Wirtschaftsfreiheit, interstate commerce clause) as well as the
Four Freedoms and the principle of non-discrimination in European Community
(EC) law-which, in turn, operate as vertical checks at other layers of governance.
Other than with regard to human rights, protection and enforcement on the inter-
national level are stronger. They are subject to the WTO dispute settlement and
compliance mechanism. It is at the heart of EC jurisprudence and plays an impor-
tant role in constitutional law and policy. It is here that multilayered governance is
perhaps most advanced, although more work on coherence will be required. The
potential to succeed is real, even under existing instruments of positive law.
36. DANIEL THUERER, I KOSMOPOLITISCHES STAATSRECHT 3-40 (2005).
37. THOMAS COTTIER & MATTHIAS OESCH, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY
IN THE WTO, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SWITZERLAND 346-427 (2005).
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2. Efforts by International Relations Theory and Moral Philosophy
Recourse to shared legal rights and obligations in positive law of all or most
states is an important and often ignored component in discussing the fundamental
problem of shared constitutional values within the international community. It is a
major achievement upon which multilayered governance builds. There is ample evi-
dence in positive law and thus of consent, in particular in the United Nations
Human Rights Covenants. At the same time, recourse to legal instruments and
black letter law is not sufficient. The objections raised in international relations the-
ory and moral philosophy are all rooted in observations looking beyond and behind
positive law. Legal instruments may have been imposed and may not reflect true
and underlying values and consent upon which society and solid governance is built.
The import of Western legal concepts may remain superficial and a matter of con-
venience, rather than being based on convictions and true beliefs. This is an impor-
tant point. Law requires underlying values of a given society or community upon
which its legitimacy relies. Such legitimacy is essential for the operation and effec-
tiveness of law. Without it, law cannot perform its main function as a stabilizer of
legitimate expectations as to human conduct. It is an essential precondition for vol-
untary compliance, without which legal systems, both domestic and international,
fail.3" Legitimacy depends upon underlying values, in particular fairness and justice.
These values draw upon perceptions of morality, which in turn rely upon traditions,
religion, philosophy, culture, and civilization. They inform the law in a dialectical
process, which in turn feeds back into moral perceptions.
Are there truly shared moral values beyond borders of traditional polities,
based upon a common heritage and human nature? The question is of core inter-
est to constitutional and international lawyers seeking to explore the potential of
shared and multilayered governance beyond the nation-state. It is at this point
that the issue becomes relevant and crucial for legal architecture. Multilayered
governance cannot work without common ethical foundations and shared beliefs.
If built in the absence of such values, it will not be sustainable.
The problem of shared values is at the heart of the debate in contemporary moral
philosophy and international political theory and the competing schools of thought.3 9
Many of the objections raised above are influenced by realism, which essentially de-
nies the existence and relevance of such values in a power- and interest-driven world,
38. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 25 (1995).
39. ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS
FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 28-29 (2007); SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL PO-
LITICAL THEORY 56 (2005); HURRELL, Upra note 2, at 85.
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or by an approach perceiving international relations merely as a society of states,
rather than of persons. They may be based on cultural relativism or on nationalism,
both of which share the denial of underlying values common to all nations.
Universalism, on the other hand, stresses the existence and the normative po-
tential of shared values. It identifies an overlapping consensus of some moral val-
ues.40 Commonalities are found and normatively argued by cosmopolitan schools.
They essentially reflect the liberal and social democratic heritage as applied to
transnational constellations. Cosmopolitanism is based upon the premise that all
human beings share traits common to the human condition,4' and essentially are
entitled to be treated alike. It is an egalitarian liberal doctrine that emphasizes
distributive justice and equal opportunities as the foundation of fairness in inter-
national relations.42 For Allan Buchanan, human rights provide the normative
foundations of international law, legitimacy, and justice.4" Cosmopolitanism is a
moral and political doctrine that extends to legal and institutional dimensions,
seeking to shape international law and global institutions in a manner that will
further the goals of moral cosmopolitanism. It is not limited to moral philosophy,
but is equally present in international relations theory, prominently expounded by
David Held.44 It amounts to an important school in political science. Summariz-
ing his book Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory, Simon Caney char-
acterizes his brand of cosmopolitanism as follows:
This book has attempted to justify an egalitarian liberal brand of
cosmopolitanism. It has defended the thesis that there are universal
principles against cultural relativists. Its general strategy has been
to show that many critiques of universalism mischaracterize it and
that other critiques are simply unpersuasive. It has defended two
universal principles of justice in particular. First: it defends a liberal
package of civil and political human rights, arguing that these are
40. CANEYsupra note 39, at 25.
41. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS, at xv (2006).
42. See, e.g., CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 127-61 (1979); see
also FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE
59-62 (2003); THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989); Frank J. Garcia, Global Justice and the Bret-
ton Woods Institutions, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 32, at 23, 26
(noting an application of the Rawlsian "Difference Principle" to international economic law).
43. BUCHANAN, sUpra note 39, at 118-90.
44. See, e.g., DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO Cos-
MOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995); DAVID HELD, GLOBAL COVENANT: THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ALTER-
NATIVE TO THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS (2004); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 1996).
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necessary to respect persons' interests in leading fulfilling lives. In
doing so, it chronicled five reasons for thinking that liberal civil
and political human rights best enable people to flourish. Second: it
defends an egalitarian distributive programme, defending subsis-
tence rights, a principle of global equality of opportunity, rules of
fair pay, and a commitment to prioritizing the least advantaged.
Furthermore, by contrast with many other cosmopolitans... the
argument for these universal principles of distributive justice does
not depend on whether there is extensive economic globalization or
not. ... Drawing on these universal principles of civil, political,
and distributive justice, this work then criticized a statist world
order and defended a system of global political authorities."a
Cosmopolitan schools of thought thus offer hope and a moral foundation
upon which multilayered governance can be built into law. Cosmopolitanism rec-
ognizes that some human values are universal and shared, while others are cul-
turally specific and local. Overall, the findings support the constitutional idea of
multilayered governance and the abolishment of a principled division between
domestic and international law. Indeed, Caney develops structures to this effect
under the heading of legal or institutional cosmopolitanism.46
3. Lessons from Legal Experience
There is thus a strong body in philosophical literature, political science and in-
ternational relations theory supporting the perception of shared values upon which
a doctrine of multilayered governance can build. International lawyers are not alone
in their quest. Yet, the cosmopolitan school remains highly controversial in light of
competing theories. As moral philosophy does not extensively take into account the
daily operation of international law, it may be helpful to introduce a proper legal
perspective at this point, beyond the recourse to positive law and consent. What can
lawyers bring to the table beyond recourse to positive law? What can we learn from
the legal experience in assessing the problem of shared values?
The process of law is informed by values, but it is mainly characterized by
competing rights and interests. It often faces competing and conflicting values.
Law inherently operates in a pluralist environment when it comes to assessing
specific and particular problems. This is certainly true for open societies, but also
45. CANEY, supra note 39, at 263-64.
46. Id. at 148-88.
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under authoritarian rule, albeit to a lesser extent. Even here, in the end, compet-
ing interests and values need to be assessed in addressing specific problems. It is
certainly true for international law. Some would argue that international law is
outright indeterminate in the final analysis.47 Outcomes, impact, and realization
of values therefore depend largely upon procedural guarantees both in the politi-
cal process and in judicial dispute settlement. This is true for all layers of gover-
nance; it is not limited to the realm of international law and relations. Again,
there are differences in degree, but not in principle. The prospects of multilayered
governance therefore depend upon the level of shared procedural avenues estab-
lished at and among different layers of governance.
The legal profession is particularly trained and versed in dealing with diverg-
ing interests and opposing views in a given context. It is able to approach problems
on the basis of defined procedures. This is particularly true in the courtroom.
Procedural fairness and preoccupation with processes are the main tools of the
profession in approaching conflicting interests and values alike, leading toward
rational decisions and justifications.
The legal experience and Western tradition of procedural fairness equally in-
forms the political process. In an open and liberal society, the latter essentially oper-
ates on the basis of critical rationalism, which considers freedom of expression and
speech as the single core value upon which basic decisions must be hammered out in
a pluralist environment. This takes into account, in a pragmatic manner, different
interests which need to be balanced with a view to finding satisfactory solutions to
practical problems. 48 The core contribution of law consists of making available
"clear, stable, and transparent procedures" that allow for "predictable decision-
making."' Contemporary challenges of ensuring sustainability and of balancing
ecological, social, and economic interests are all informed by a procedural approach
and school familiar to lawyers.5" Lawyers, thus, may particularly contribute toward
exploring the relationship of values and procedural guarantees.
47. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 153-57 (2006).
48. HANS ALBERT, TRAKTAT UBER KRITISCHE VERNUNFT 173-82 (3d ed. 1975). See generally KARL
POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1945).
49. Esty, supra note 34, at 73 (citing LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)).
50. See generally Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Markus W. Gehring, Introduction to SUS-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD TRADE LAW 1, 1-22 (Markus W. Gehring & Marie-Claire Cor-
donier Segger eds., 2005).
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B. Human Rights Protection
We now briefly turn to human rights and to equal conditions of competition
and property protection in international economic law, which we have identified
as being potential cornerstones of multilayered governance.5 They all derive from
shared principles of liberty, but have been implemented in quite different ways.52
They have been adopted and supported for different reasons, as have the values
underlying them. They follow different procedures. They often compete with
other institutions on an operational level. They are both relevant to multilayered
governance to the extent that they offer checks and balances on different layers.
Human rights have been ratified in terms of treaty obligations by a large ma-
jority of states. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well
as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, are
practically universal in scope.5" Formally, they provide the foundations of univer-
sally recognized, and thus shared, values. They are the paradigm of universalism,
although not all the rights may be of equal importance to the entire world. It is
fair to say that human rights values are shared and agreed upon in principle for all
layers of governance alike. They are essential coordinates. Today, they amount to
the most deeply anchored principles in law. Nobody seriously argues against them,
and the concept is widely accepted, at least as a core. No government can afford to
challenge human rights as an ideal. From a cosmopolitan view, there can be no
doubt that people share human rights as common ideals, values, and goals. They
are the main guarantees and expressions of hope. People have their values, and
they do not make a principled difference as to the layer of governance concerned.
The International Covenants essentially address domestic affairs; states are
51. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutional Economics, Human Rights and the Future of the WTO,
58 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 49 (2003); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Cosmopolitan Democracy
and the Law of the World Trade Organization, in FOUNDATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 79-96 (Ian Fletcher et al. eds., 2001); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Morality, Human Rights
and International Economic Law: Towards Cosmopolitan Market Integration Law?, in RECHT UND
ETHOS IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG 53-86 (H.D. Assmann & R. Sethe eds., 2004); Ernst-Ul-
rich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations "Global Compact"for Integrating Human Rights into the
Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 621 (2002).
52. See Thomas Cottier, Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 111
(2002).
53. For a comprehensive and recent analysis, see WALTER KAELIN & JOERG KUENZLI, UNIVERSELLER
MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ (2d ed. 2008); CHRISTIAN ToMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN IDEALISM
AND REALISM 58-83 (2003). For the legal instruments, see Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, International Law, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law (last visited
Feb. 26, 2009).
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under an obligation to treat human beings within their jurisdiction accordingly.
Most national constitutions reflect these commitments, and the same is true for
contemporary EC law. It is, however, a different matter as to whether these agree-
ments truly reflect a strong commitment of governments around the world, given
today's realities of constant abuse and violations. Governments were able to enter
these agreements at a very low cost, but it is still an open question to what extent
these governments adhere for convenience, with little consequence to the domes-
tic power structures of a system based upon sovereignty of states.
Implementing human rights values in legal orders has been, and remains,
difficult.54 Human rights offer guidance in domestic policymaking, legislation,
and adjudication, but implementation by means of international law remains
weak, given widespread authoritarian regimes and frequent allocation of re-
sources for purposes other than protection and promotion of human rights. In
practical terms, the Covenants introduce only feeble elements of multilayered
governance. This is also partly true for the European Convention on Human
Rights, as members are not obliged to implement rulings of the European Court
of Human Rights, but are limited to offering compensation to victims of rights
violations. Implementation varies among members of the Covenants. It largely
depends upon domestic law and legal culture. It has an impact on members based
upon western traditions of constitutional law. It is still weak in countries with
authoritarian traditions. Importantly, these deficiencies do not relate to the con-
tent and scope of rights, but instead to modes and procedures of protection, which
vary considerably among different layers of governance and still lack overall co-
herence. The lack of efficient procedures, however, may be an indication that the
rights and underlying values are not truly shared and are not taken seriously by
all. Indeed, different agendas are pursued for human rights.
The main function of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was to
overcome the legacy of colonialism and related racism and to loosen the restrict-
ing notion of civilized nations in the wake of decolonization. The main obligation
to arise from this evolution rested with former metropolitan powers and industri-
alized nations.55 After the trauma of World War II, it was an idealist response to
the colonial state, the failure of so-called civilized nations to deal with racial and
54. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1986).
55. Thomas Cottier, Cosmopolitan Values in International Economic Law: Myths and Realities (Nat'l
Ctr. of Competence in Res. Trade Reg., Working Paper No. 22, 2008), available at http://www
.nccr-trade.org/ip-l/cosmopolitan-values-in-international-economic-law-myths-and-realities-2.html.
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cultural discrimination and imperialism. 6 It was an agenda to be primarily ap-
plied at home in industrialized nations, and an effort at establishing long-term
responsibilities vis-A-vis developing countries in terms of supporting human rights
protection around the globe. Much progress has been achieved in combating ra-
cial discrimination in industrialized countries. Prejudice has been reduced, often
due to constitutional rights and accompanying procedures. Much remains to be
done, particularly in an era of increased international migration and global inte-
gration. So far, development assistance, incentives in economic policies, and other
efforts to build respect for human rights in developing countries have remained
modest. Procedural guarantees are lacking. These countries are often left alone
with their challenges for financial reasons, and human rights intervention has
remained controversial in international law. Developing countries primarily em-
phasize social and economic rights, including a broad right to development, in
order to argue in support of claims for distributive justice and framework condi-
tions in international economic relations conducive to meeting their needs. In re-
turn, political and civil rights are considered in relation to the political systems in
place, as a matter of domestic affairs, and are protected from foreign intervention
under Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter.
Human rights policies are thus informed by diverging and competing interests.
At the same time, appropriate procedures to address and settle such competition are
lacking. This explains the main difficulties encountered in the realization of human
rights. Moreover, the relationship to other policies often remains unclear. In interna-
tional economic law, linkages to human rights have not been fully developed and
the two fields were traditionally dealt with in isolation. It is only recently that bridges
have been built in legal theory. Much work still lies ahead in building appropriate
procedures that allow linking of different policy goals in a particular context.
In assessing these realities and imperfections in light of multilayered gover-
nance, it is important to stress that comparable difficulties also exist within states.
Difficulties are by no means limited to the international realm. The program of so-
cial and economic rights has been controversial in most countries and lies at the
heart of the discourse on distributive justice in pluralist societies. Protection of civil
and political rights is the object of constant struggle and a stream of case law. Proce-
dures vary and determine the effectiveness of protection. There are wide discrepan-
cies within countries and within different political systems. While some allow for
strong legal protection, others do not. Judicial review may simply be excluded or
limited, or it may vary for different layers of domestic governance. The Swiss Con-
56. See EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 7 (1994).
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stitution, for example, in principle excludes constitutional review of federal statutes,
but allows it for sub-federal acts. 7 Even in mature democracies, the contours and
shaping of human rights protection remains a matter of disagreement, and they
struggle as new challenges to freedom and security of individuals arise. This is
equally true for the European Union, where the protection of fundamental rights is
strongly anchored in the treaty and case law, but constantly competes with other
policy goals, in particular fundamental freedoms relating to market access.
The difficulties in implementing human rights on all layers of governance show
that they, and the values underlying them, compete with other interests and policy
goals, including competing human rights. The problem is not one of underlying
values, but of competition of divergent values and interests at stake in a given con-
text. There is wide and considerable disagreement on the question of the extent to
which resources should be allocated to these values, both internally and in foreign
relations. On all layers, procedures for implementing rights on the operational level
are of key importance and determine the extent to which human rights values are
translated into reality. Human rights protection still suffers from structural ineffi-
ciencies on the international level as well as in most countries. Shared values and
rights, in other words, are not yet sufficiently matched in terms of procedural guar-
antees. Differences exist between different layers of government, but they are differ-
ences in degree, and not in principle. The challenge is one of designing appropriate
processes and providing checks and balances in multilayered governance.
C. International Trade Regulation
1. Equal Conditions of Competition
In international trade relations, the WTO principles of non-discrimination
constitute the core principles of the international trading system, shared by more
than 150 members of the WTO.8 In contrast to human rights agreements, these
principles do not offer easy access. Membership in the WTO is accompanied by
substantial concessions of liberalization, which have an effective impact on domestic
structures. The willingness to adhere to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and the WTO as the successor organization, therefore, may be con-
57. Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidegenossenschaft [BV], [Constitution] Apr. 18,
1999, art. 190 (Switz.).
58. See, e.g., COTTIER & OESCH, supra note 37, at 346-512. For the legal instruments, see Under-
standing the WTO-Principles of the Trading System, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis e/tif e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 26,2009).
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sidered as evidence of a true commitment to the underlying values of equal condi-
tions of competition in international economic relations. Upon deciding to join the
WTO, countries may have been compelled to accept these principles in order to
promote export potentials. However, it would seem difficult to argue that members
do not share the underlying value of fairness inherent in non-discrimination.
The WTO principles securing equal conditions of competition are subject to
WTO dispute settlement, compensation, or trade sanctions in the case of failure
to comply with rulings. While the principles are well-established, their particular
contours are subject to a constant flow of case law, balancing equal conditions
with other policy goals that may call for protection. As a principle, non-discrimi-
nation is established; only its operation is subject to discourse and conflict. Again,
as in the case of human rights, the operation essentially depends upon efficient
procedures. The same is true for other layers of governance. The protection of
non-discrimination depends upon legal protection in constitutional courts and
the European Court of Justice. Such protection may sometimes be even stronger
at the international level than at the domestic level. In many members of the
WTO, individuals and companies may not be able to invoke a corresponding con-
stitutional right in defense of their economic interests. Similar to human rights,
the emphasis in disputes is on balancing competing interests and assessing poten-
tial exemptions to these principles. We observe the same pattern: it is not a matter
of questioning the legitimacy of principles of non-discrimination as basic values,
but of balancing them with competing policy interests. This balance depends
largely upon procedural guarantees.
In conclusion, basic principles of international economic law enjoy advanced
levels of protection and implementation. This is an indication that underlying
values are taken seriously and are truly shared. Procedures to arbitrate competing
interests are well developed in WTO law, as well as in EU and constitutional law.
Such procedures are at the heart of contemporary multilayered governance.
2. Property Rights and Related Values
International trade law is of interest in assessing property rights and related
values. Property protection amounts to a key feature in market economies, and
the way it is addressed offers insights as to the extent to which it amounts to a
shared value. It is interesting to see that property, as a basic legal institution, is
protected for diverging reasons and underlying values.
Real property is weakly protected in customary international law. The pro-
tection essentially applies only to arbitrary expropriation, and there are no clear
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standards for compensation. In contrast, intellectual property is subject to strong
protection within the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPs) of the WTO. 9 TRIPs is an important element of multilay-
ered governance. It amounts to a paradigm of global economic law, setting
minimal standards in the field. WTO dispute settlement supports the implemen-
tation of standards, much as EC law in this field exerts a similar impact on mem-
ber states of the European Union. This model of dispute settlement is anchored in
law and is accompanied by efficient procedures in order to play its role in a system
of multilayered governance.
While protection, in principle, may be accepted, there is considerable controversy
as to whether the levels of protection provided for in TRIPs are appropriate for devel-
oping countries. TRIPs is widely conceived of as an imposed agreement, to which
developing countries were forced to adhere within the package deal of the Uruguay
Round. Developing countries perceive it as an imposed value, and implementation
therefore faces difficulties and resistance. In practical terms, intellectual property
protection in developing countries operates under a doctrine of benign neglect and is
therefore subject to informal gradation. It only becomes of practical relevance in in-
ternational relations to the extent that an industry achieves competitiveness.6"
Patent protection is an important ingredient in establishing equal conditions of
competition and thus of competition law and policy at large. It thereby forms part of
the overall values enshrined in WTO law. But in the future, gradation should be
formalized with a view to achieving better legal security and predictability for de-
veloping countries.6' Intellectual property protection becomes essential only once an
economy starts competing and where the lack of protection causes distortions. Prior
to that stage, developing countries should not be obliged to comply with demanding
standards in order to foster social and economic development. But, it would seem
wrong to argue that private property protection is not legitimate as a long-term in-
vestment within the WTO system. It is an essential ingredient of fostering innova-
tion and thus contributing to welfare. Intellectual property is a utilitarian concept; it
is not based upon human rights, except for some aspects of copyright. Whether it
amounts to a shared or imposed value is a matter of controversy. Yet, the problem is
less one of principle than one of properly shaping the contours and scope of intel-
59. See generally FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN
INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (2007).
60. Cottier, supra note 55, at 6-9.
61. See Thomas Cottier, From Progressive Liberalization to Progressive Regulation, 9 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 779 (2006).
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lectual property rights, commensurate with levels of social and economic develop-
ment. If properly shaped and balanced against other policy goals, intellectual
property is able to serve a cosmopolitan agenda and embrace shared values, such as
the promotion of health and nutrition.
Another area of strong property protection is agriculture, in the sense that
existing structures are essentially maintained and protected, or at least much more
so than in any other sector of the economy. Other than in the field of intellectual
property rights, equal conditions of competition are distorted by enhanced levels
of border protection and domestic support on the part of industrialized countries.
These levels of protection do not sufficiently take into account the impact on pro-
ducers and farmers in other countries, particularly in the developing world. I sub-
mit that the protection of agricultural property in terms of preserving traditional
perceptions, values of cultural diversity and identity, and sentiments of homeland
depict the traditions of nationalism in political and moral philosophy.
Current policies do not yet sufficiently take into account cosmopolitan values.6
Market access for those in need of it is largely denied, at high cost to consumers and
foreign producers alike. The close relationship between poverty in developing coun-
tries and conservative patterns of traditional agriculture in industrialized countries
is not sufficiently clear to the public at large. The pursuit of values of equal condi-
tions of competition implies limitations on this kind of property protection and val-
ues. There is a clash of competing values, and the difficulties experienced in trying
to conclude the present Doha Development Agenda emphasize the basic tensions.
In conclusion, property protection shows different traits. Partly, it may, under
appropriate conditions, amount to a cosmopolitan value, and partly it is motivated
by interests and values embedded in nationalism. These values are not inherently
shared by all, but imposed by some on others. But whatever their foundation, they
find themselves competing with other policy goals and values. The search for ap-
propriate regulations and implementation depends primarily upon political pro-
cesses and the availability of effective dispute settlement.
III. CONFLICTING VALUES AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT
As a result, competing universal human rights values are often compromised in
state practice, and the WTO reveals a mixed bag of underlying values within the
broadly agreed-upon legal principles of creating equal conditions of competition for
imported and domestic goods and services. Property protection cuts both ways and
62. Cottier, supra note 55, at 9-10.
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is motivated by different sets of values, which are partly cosmopolitan and partly
nationalist. They are partly agreed upon and partly controversial and refuted. And
even where they are agreed on in principle, they remain controversial when it comes
to specific contours and implementation, as the fields of human rights and intellec-
tual property show. There is no agreement as to distributive justice in international
law. We are left with substantial divergence. Realists will tend to see their theories
confirmed. The findings confirm a high degree of diversity and pluralism among
states and the international community when it comes to implementing commonly
agreed-upon rights, obligations, and underlying shared values.
The point to recall, however, is that these tensions exist similarly within the
boundaries of nation. We argued that differences are matters of degree, not of
principle. We find agreement on basic tenets and values, but disagreement when
it comes to implementation and realization with competing interests and values.
Thus, individuals disagree on the scope of human rights, in particular relating to
distributive justice, and even on matters like freedom of speech. People disagree
on equal conditions of competition and the scope of economic freedom and its
limitations, as much as on the contours of the Four Freedoms in European Com-
munity Law. People disagree on the particular contours of patent rights, for ex-
ample, in relation to genetic engineering or parallel imports. They disagree on
appropriate levels of protection of agriculture in domestic and regional fora. Plu-
ralism at home essentially builds upon disagreement.
Samantha Besson elaborated on this point in her seminal work The Morality of
Conflict: Reasonable Disagreement and the Law.6' The brief discussions of human
rights and economic law confirm her findings: people agree on general concepts
only, but inherently disagree on specific contours of basic values such as freedom,
democracy, or equality. These values are "essentially contestable concepts."64 Values
and principles in law are "essentially incomplete theorised agreements."'6 They need
to be made more concrete. Disagreement is the normal state of affairs in a domestic
polity. People have different views and perceptions of justice. On these premises,
Besson develops a theory that essentially focuses on appropriate procedures relating
to discourse and decision-making. Different from ideals of consensus and deliberate
democracy, she reemphasizes the need for voting ethics and majority rule66 in order
63. SAMANTHA BESSON, THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT: REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT AND THE LAW
(2005).
64. Id. at 156, 331.
65. Id. at 331.
66. Id. at 254.
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to cope with conflicting values. She recognizes the need for procedural constitu-
tional restraints for the benefit of the democratic process.67 She emphasizes the need
for a carefully "balanced dialogue between the judiciary and the legislator"'68 within
what she calls a model of "weak constitutionalism" in the sense that constitutions
also need to be subject to revision in accordance with qualified rules.69 The main
function of the law amounts to coordination of competing moral values upon which
the authority of law and duties to comply rely, as well as resistance to compliance,
are developed on that basis.7'
These findings are immensely relevant for the doctrine of multilayered gov-
ernance. Disagreement on values is present on all levels of governance. Theories
claiming a special status of values of the domestic polity are refuted, and concep-
tual barriers between domestic and international law fall apart. The theory offers
the potential for a coherent and uniform approach to values and their indetermi-
nacies on the basis of a state of basic rational disagreement and pluralism. On all
levels alike, the emphasis is on process, rather than on substance. Indeed, tradi-
tional dichotomies between constitutional law and international law may be found
in the tradition of perceiving constitutions as material foundations of society,
rather than as an instrument of government, the focus of which is on procedures.
In her conclusions, Besson discusses the potential of her theory for interna-
tional relations as a matter of reasonable legal pluralism beyond the state level.7'
The theory offers the foundation of what she calls cooperative sovereignty,72 which
entails an understanding of meaningful coordination of different levels of gover-
nance, from local to global. She expounds the principles of cooperative sovereignty
and of global coherence:
First of all, a revised conception of cooperative sovereignty could
arise from a more elaborate approach to global legal plural-
ism.... Sovereignty should be conceived as a reflexive concept
whose correct use is to reflect on and disagree over the values pro-
tected by sovereignty, i.e. mainly democracy and fundamental
rights.... The protection of the values underlying those contest-
able concepts would therefore benefit more from cooperation be-
67. Id. at 317.
68. Id. at 333.
69. Id. at 323.
70. Id. at 466.
71. Id. at 534.
72. Id. at 535.
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tween different competent authorities and entities and how best to
protect their common values and hence on when to give up sover-
eignty to others, than from the mere declaration of primacy of one
sovereign over the other. As it is at once open and closed, coopera-
tive sovereignty could both frame and stimulate the debates that go
deep into the heart of what should be the best allocation of power
and this not only in Europe, but also on a more global scale....
Secondly, cooperative sovereignty could give rise to a principle of global coher-
ence in conditions of reasonable post- and supranational pluralism. When con-
flicting sovereign positions are understood as being in a cooperative relationship
rather than an adversarial one, it is easy to see how a principle of respect for oth-
ers' reasonable albeit different positions should be developed on the model of the
principle of legal coherence at the infra-state level.... None of the conflicting
sources of legality should be primarily subordinated to others and local gover-
nance should be able to coexist and flourish alongside global governance, provided
conflict becomes a source of mutual learning and principled consistency in the
cooperative venture of providing the common subjects to these different legal or-
ders the values and certainty which the rule of law aims at securing for them.73
The concept thus supports what cosmopolitans seek in terms of appropriate
multilevel structures with a view to optimally achieving their values.74 It essen-
tially corresponds to the doctrine of compensatory constitutionalism,75 the doc-
trine of sovereignty-modern,76 and the doctrine of a five-story house.77 While
supremacy of global law is the rule as an organizing principle, the latter allows for
exceptions based upon the protection of human rights and fundamental values.
Primacy should be defined according to a substantive rather than formal hierar-
chy78 in order take into account the experience of failures of different layers of
government, which need to be remedied within a system of checks and balances.
All the theories share the view that allocation of powers should be looked at
within an overall coherent framework with a view to bringing about the best re-
sults for the underlying values for which they stand. The existence of pluralism
73. Id. at 535-36.
74. CANEY,supra note 39, at 163.
75. Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental
International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 570 (2006).
76. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern, supra note 30, at 785.
77. Cottier & Hertig, supra note 24, at 261.
78. Peters, supra note 24, at 251, 306-07.
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and conflict and the absence of harmony at all layers alike, albeit to a different
degree, inherently draw attention to the issues of appropriate procedures of deci-
sion-making and dispute settlement among and within different layers of gover-
nance.79 The question arises as to whether, despite differences in degree, there is a
common core of values underlying debate and discourse that offers a common
framework for decision-making in multilayered governance.
IV. THE QUEST FOR COMMON STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES
A. Foundations
Despite the harsh realities of a power-driven world, it is fair to say that some
basic values are shared among people who, after all, share a broad range of activi-
ties and experiences in their lives.8" Wherever people go on their journey, not
knowing their fate,8 they are likely to concur in principle with the following val-
ues and moral obligations: respect of basic human rights; distributive justice and
equity, and, in particular, satisfaction of basic needs in terms of food, shelter, cloth-
ing, and education; fairness and equal opportunity; and protection of good faith
and legitimate expectation at whatever layer and form of governance they are ex-
posed to. These values can be found in all of the world's legal cultures and reli-
gions in one expression or another. 2 They are supported by moral philosophy
and, increasingly, by international relations theory. They can be found in national
constitutions and in international agreements, confirming a common moral
ground in law. They allow one to conclude that these are truly human values of
global reach and are not limited to the Western hemisphere. And to the extent
that doubts exist, these values legitimately inform a normative agenda of what
should be achieved in terms of shared values in a globalizing world.
These basic values provide the basis for government and process on all layers.
They inform shared values in structural and procedural terms of decision-mak-
ing. It is fair to conclude from human experience these basic values can best be
achieved if procedural fairness, inclusiveness and participation, and reliance upon
the ideals of legal protection through courts, are secured, widely shared, and form
79. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, From State Sovereignty to the "Sovereignty of Citizens" in the Inter-
national Relations Law of the EU?, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 145-65 (N. Walker ed., 2003).
80. See generally APPIAH, SUpra note 41.
81. RAWLS, SUpra note 19, at 11.
82. See generally EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Ralph A.
Newman ed., 1973).
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the basis of government around the world.83 The law teaches us that perhaps the
most basic and shared value as a prerequisite of governance and multilayered gov-
ernance is a shared belief in peaceful processes of negotiation, discourse, decision-
making, and settlement of disputes based upon competing values and legal
claims.84 It offers the main basis for developing agreed-upon structures and proce-
dures on shared levels of governance.
True, people will not necessarily agree more easily on procedures than on sub-
stance.85 Yet the situation is no different from other incomplete agreements relating
to values on substance. The same pattern emerges here: there is common ground on
widely shared and universally accepted values, but divergence in operation and im-
plementation of such principles produces pluralism within common parameters.
We should neither expect nor envisage uniform solutions, but instead focus on very
basic tenets largely shared by people around the world. The fact that these tenets
often remain incomplete, or are not implemented in many countries around the
world, does not mean that they do not exist as widely shared ideals and aspirations
upon which common structures can be built. Likewise, the fact that these ideals
largely build upon Western traditions of statehood does not disqualify them from
global reach. These traditions have underpinned the law and life of international
relations for more than three hundred years and are deeply entrenched. Countries
fundamentally ignoring these values fail to provide the basis for sustainable welfare
and prosperity. At the same time, they offer ample variations allowing the accom-
modation of divergent cultural backgrounds and cultural diversity.
Identification of basic shared and existing core values underlying contempo-
rary governmental structures may perhaps be best approached by way of exclu-
sion. Nobody today morally endorses tyranny, dictatorship, or terror. In some
parts, legitimacy is still derived from deity, and the authority of power remains
highly centralized. Yet it is fair to assume that most people subject to any form of
governance subscribe deep in their hearts to the protection of human rights, to the
prevailing universal ideals of governance in the twenty-first century, namely, de-
mocracy and the ideal of legitimate power originating in delegation by the people
and for the people within a constitutional framework. The basic values of democ-
racy and majority rule, separation of powers and checks and balances, the rule of
83. For a discussion of trade governance, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Judicial Gov-
ernance of International Trade Requires a Common Conception of Rule of Law and Justice, in THE
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw, supra note 32, at 91-114.
84. Hooghe & Marks, supra note 29.
85. This point was stressed by Andreas F0l1esdal at the 2008 Kandersteg meeting.
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law, and transparency are generally agreed upon under the U.N. Charter and
offer solid foundations to build upon. It is widely accepted that they provide the
most stable and least unfair system of government if complemented by effective
protection of human rights and, thus, of minorities. They have the best record as
foundations for economic growth and welfare, as today's operating and enforced
principles of equal conditions of competition demonstrate. Protection of the prin-
ciples of non-discrimination can be found on all levels of government, including
global law, and provide the backbone for structuring limitations to governmental
discretion in the pursuit of cosmopolitan values and the protection of the interests
of those who do not form part of a particular constituency and polity.
Putting all these values into operation remains a matter of politics, debate,
negotiations, and the exercise of power in building structures of multilayered gov-
ernance. There is ample room for differences, cultural diversity, and pluralism
within a system which no longer fundamentally distinguishes between domestic,
regional, and global law, but which seeks to bring about a coherent framework of
governance commensurate with the process of globalization and contemporary
and future challenges. General values agreed upon do not define allocation of
powers, degrees of redistribution, or levels of taxation. Moral disagreement offers
the starting point for addressing these issues, and compromise and coordination
will need to be settled in the law of the different layers of government.
B. Global Governance
The main operational challenges will consist of finding common structures
and procedures on the global level, based upon the broad values identified, and
determining how these structures should influence other layers of governance.
We need to work on enhanced coordination of judicial reviews in order to render
vertical checks and balances fully operational and mutually supportive. Standards
of review both of domestic and international courts need to be aligned and better
coordinated.86 The challenges of democratic accountability and legitimacy, due
process, checks and balances, the relationship of legislative and adjudicative bod-
ies-both within a layer and among layers, and thus horizontally and vertically-
and the issue of compliance deserve the most attention and elaboration in
furthering the doctrine of multilayered governance. We need to work on coherent
procedures for decision-making in order to coordinate efforts on different layers
of government. These procedures need to go beyond modes of negotiations, to
86. COTTIER & OESCH, SUpra note 37, at 513-17.
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care about decision-making even if a consensus cannot be reached. This is equally
true for the layer of international relations. s7 Negotiations will be needed to ham-
mer out solutions, implement broadly shared values, and render them operational
on the level of global governance. The main issue will be majority voting and the
implementation of democratic values in international decision-making.
In a multipolar world, in order to avoid a stalemate, consensus-based decision-
making in international organizations should be backed by voting. Efficient deci-
sion-making is a corollary to the finding that values compete in operation. Workable
procedures to complete agreements are essential. Traditional modes of consensus
and blocking powers either relate to a false perception of uniform values or to the
imposition of values by power. They depict an equality of states that does not exist in
reality. They do not respond to the ideals of pluralism and democracy and the basic
legitimacy of majoritarian rule. The core of shared values identified-and taking
into account the global challenges shared by all, such as climate change-allow, and
indeed require, further progress. We recall that the inception of democracy in na-
tion-states was an experiment with unpredictable results; it acquired legitimacy and
authority over time. It was a process and not static, but a process needing courage
that was undertaken by farsighted people." The same is true for the process of en-
hancing democratic legitimacy within the European Union. A similar courageous
start is required on the global level. We need to take basic and shared values of de-
mocracy seriously on all layers of governance and seek implementation in appropri-
ate forms and modes. Only upon gaining experience with majoritarian rule can
trust, confidence, and community be built within the international society.
Voting by states should be based upon weighted voting, taking into account
appropriate factors, such as size of population, gross national product, interna-
tional dependence (trade shares, import/export ratios), in order to approximate
formal and real powers of countries and their stake and impact in international
relations. 9 It allows one to approximate tensions between global citizenship and
representation of states. The past experience with weighted voting in the Bretton
87. In line with critical rationalism, see ALBERT, supra note 48, at 181 (arguing that the need for
majority ruling goes beyond the Habermasian discourse principle which ideally relies upon nego-
tiations and consensus); cf. JIERGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996).
88. Cf. Peters, supra note 20.
89. For a detailed calculation of potential voting rights and powers based upon such criteria at
the WTO, see Thomas Cottier & Satoko Takenoshita, Decision-making and the Balance of Powers
in the WTO Negotiations: Towards Supplementary Weighted Voting, in AT THE CROSSROADS: THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AND THE DOHA ROUND 181 (Stefan Griller ed., 2008).
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Woods institutions" does not prevent the search for more appropriate and fair al-
locations of voting rights and powers. In a pluralist world, decision-making will
be characterized by flexible and changing coalitions, and an overall balance of
industrialized, emerging, developing, and least developed economies can be
achieved. At any rate, no single power and nation alone should be able, or entitled,
to block decisions adopted by a majority of states. This reflects ideals of democ-
racy and appropriate representation. It may be objected to on the grounds that
majoritarian rule poses a fundamental paradox with national sovereignty and do-
mestic democratic rule, which cannot be solved. We agree that this is true for the
current, but rarely applied, principle of one state, one vote.91 Yet properly weighted
voting is able to reduce tensions between representation of individuals and of
states. We recall that both the protection of human rights and non-discrimination
in international economic law serve the purpose of preventing and remedying
state failures which may be induced by domestic majority decisions. The alloca-
90. For a critique see GARCIA, supra note 42.
91. Peters, supra note 20 ("Persons are not fairly represented by the scheme 'one-state-one vote' in
treaty making and for the production of secondary international law. So even if all states, 'large and
small' could perfectly fairly participate on an equal footing, and were in themselves perfect democra-
cies, this would not mean democracy in the sense of global citizens' rule. On the contrary, the equal-
ity, inclusiveness and representativeness of states in international organisations are in tension with the
idea of equality and representation of world citizens. Because states contain vastly different sizes of
populations, there is no correlation between states' votes and citizens' votes. Equality of more popu-
lated states results in the inequality of citizens (as global citizens), and their representation is totally
skewed. In that perspective, state majoritarianism is an impediment to the effective institutional ex-
pression of equal consideration of natural persons. Coordination among (more or less democratic)
polities (states and international organisations democratised along the line we proposed) will fre-
quently contradict democratic choices made within other democratic units of the network. Inter-state
majoritarianism is, in a democratic perspective, ambiguous. As the ultimate reference point of de-
mocracy is natural persons, we must take into account the democratic formation of collective prefer-
ences within the nation states. We then face a paradox. In the inter-state perspective, it seems
illegitimate and undemocratic that a minority (one state) can block a treaty. On the other hand, such
a veto power seems necessary to preserve the democratic decision-making on the 'lower' level, within
the smaller community. In that perspective, an extension of the inter-state majority principle aggra-
vates the democratic deficit for three reasons: First, in a system of inter-state majority voting, the de-
feated nation's collective preferences (which have been determined through a democratic procedure)
are completely ignored. When those nations' choices are based on the will of democratic majorities
that are properly constituted according to the rules of their domestic arena, the decisions from 'above'
will be experienced as undemocratic, even though in their own terms they were perfectly formally
democratic. So in the two-level game, the question whether unanimity or majoritarian decision-
making among states on the international plane is 'more democratic' is insoluble, if we take seriously
both collectively reached decisions on both levels. But how should conflicts between two (more or
less) democratically reached collective preferences be solved? ").
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tion of voting rights in the European Communities demonstrates that the rela-
tionship of international and domestic layers of governance is not fundamentally
different from that in relations between central government and members of a
federal state. Again, the problem of democratic legitimacy is a matter of degree,
rather than of principle. Yet it is submitted that the goal and direction are cor-
rect.9 2 It is here that the main efforts toward coherence need to be made and
achieved in institutional terms.
CONCLUSION
Multilayered governance is built, and depends, upon the identification of core
values which are shared and which are able to offer a common framework for all
layers equally. Whether and to what extent values are truly common can best be as-
sessed in terms of the related procedural rights and obligations of protection and
enforcement. A comparison of legal protection in human rights and international
economic law shows diverging levels of protection in domestic and international law
both within and between the respective fields. Procedures are key and where they
are lacking, values cannot be realized. In fact, the existence of common procedures
itself offers evidence of shared values. Where they are lacking, the commonality of
shared values is weak or even non-existent, reduced to a formal shell. Likewise,
where shared values are aspired to, we need to create appropriate procedures to pro-
tect and implement those values. Shared processes and structures of decision-mak-
ing ultimately define the extent to which constitutionalization and multilayered
governance exist and emerge. It is here that we face the challenge of finding more
appropriate ways and means of decision-making on the global level, taking into ac-
count basic values of participation, democracy, and judicial protection. There is an
ample body of values and principles relating to good governance upon which coher-
ent structures of multilayered government can be built.
Indeed, the lessons to be learned from our observations are that the main
92. See ANDREW HURELL, ON GLOBAL ORDER: POWER, VALUES, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SOCIETY 315,318 (2004) (expressing skepticism about whether proper discourse can be found in
international relations, but stressing, at the same time, the importance of process, stating "[a] revalida-
tion of process legitimacy and procedural justice is crucial for the development of a stable, effective,
and legitimate international society and for the nurturing of meaningfully shared foundations for the
discussion of global justice. In a very important sense, the ethical claims of international society rest on
the contention that such a society continues to be the most stable set of globally institutionalized po-
litical processes by which norms and rules can be negotiated on the basis of dialogue and consent,
rather than simply being imposed by the most powerful."); see also Hooghe & Marks, supra note 29.
MULTILAYERED GOVERNANCE
emphasis of multilayered governance needs to be placed on structures and proce-
dures, rather than content beyond broad, and thus incomplete, theorized agree-
ments. Once we accept pluralism of moral values within and beyond national
borders as a normal state of affairs, the bridge to overcome traditional divides be-
tween different layers of governance, including international law, is conceptually
built. We need to limit the concept of shared values to very basic precepts and
principles and allow ample room for pluralist variations in different contexts. We
cannot expect more than very basic agreement on human values at all levels of
government. The operation and implementation of these values differ widely and
will continue to differ. They remain incomplete and controversial within societies
and among societies. They offer a common ground, but are subject to different
outcomes and sometimes to disrespect, as practical solutions result in competition
of diverging values and rights. Inherently, they result in a pluralist and inconsis-
tent landscape in different societies and on different layers of governance. This is
true both in substance and in procedural terms. Societies and states continue to
vary and have particularities even with shared values and common layers of gov-
ernance. Shared values, in other words, do not prevent or exclude diversity. They
do not render the world a flat place, devoid of cultural differences.93 Globalization
is not just about uniformity; it is as much about interaction that is complementary
to divergence and diversity. International law is not simply about harmonization
and uniformity; it is equally about protecting legitimate cultural divergence.94
The same is true of regional law, in particular in the European Union. It is equally
a common trait and purpose of federalist structures.
On these premises, nothing prevents building upon human experience in the
legal process and bridging the divide between domestic and international law.
The approach is suitable beyond the realm of cosmopolitanism. It may embrace
different schools of thought, such as the idea of a society of states, of cultural rela-
tivism, even of realism to the extent that these schools agree on very basic traits of
the human condition and on structures of democratic government in a pluralist
society where most is left to debate, the political process, negotiations and the set-
tlement of disputes. It offers the foundations upon which the quest for appropriate
structures and procedures within a comprehensive doctrine of multilayered gov-
ernance can be built in the coming decades.
93. Contra THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2005).
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